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Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering
of Private and Business Law
Gregory Shaffer*
This symposium theorizes and assesses transnational legal ordering of private
law and business regulation in relation to the state. Such law and regulation seek to
produce order in an issue area that relevant actors construe as a problem. The issues
that the symposium covers include labor rights, corporate social responsibility, the
regulation of financial derivatives, and the allocation of authority among courts to
hear transnational disputes. The applicable norms adopt various forms and they
vary in their formally binding nature. They are transnational insofar as they
transcend and permeate state boundaries. The symposium evaluates developments
in these areas, and the challenges and limits various initiatives face. It concludes
with articles by leading theorists of private law from a transnational perspective.
The participants engage with the theoretical lens of Transnational Legal Orders
(or TLOs) as elaborated in a book by Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer.1 That
book’s conclusion noted areas for future research and set forth a series of
hypotheses that arose inductively from the book’s empirical studies in different
substantive areas. The conclusion, in particular, noted the need to address private
law and private ordering in relation to the TLO framework. This symposium helps
fill that gap. It addresses each of the substantive issues noted above, and includes
theoretical articles regarding the public/private distinction and the role of the state
in relation to TLO theory.
Private law and business regulation increasingly are shaped transnationally in
different ways. As countries liberalize markets and private actors engage in
transnational exchange, private law and regulatory institutions adapt. This
symposium assesses and evaluates the extent that changes in private law and
business regulation transcend the state and give rise to transnational legal orders. By
a transnational legal order, Halliday and Shaffer refer to law and regulation that seek
to produce order in an issue area that relevant actors construe as a “problem”; that
are legal insofar as they adopt legal form to address the problem, including through
directly or indirectly engaging national legal bodies; and that are transnational insofar
as they transcend and permeate state boundaries. The symposium participants
* Gregory Shaffer is Chancellor’s Professor, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
1. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015)
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respectively evaluate privately made norms addressing labor protection (Larry Catá
Backer) and corporate social responsibility (Cynthia Williams), the regulation of
financial derivatives (Hannah Buxbaum), conflict-of-laws regimes (Christopher
Whytock), legal pluralism and TLOs (Peer Zumbansen), and the state as a TLO
(Ralf Michaels).
The symposium begins with Larry Catá Backer’s article “Are Supply Chains
Transnational Legal Orders? What We Can Learn from the Rana Plaza Factory Collapse.” In
this article, Backer examines in detail the array of state and non-state actors engaged
in reforming the governance of global supply chains operating in Bangladesh and
elsewhere. The actors include the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU),
U.S and European multinational companies, labor unions, civil society
organizations, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Bangladesh itself. A group
of North American apparel companies and retailers, known as the Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety (the “Alliance”), agreed to a series of initiatives and
commitments to enhance worker safety and protection in Bangladesh. In parallel, a
group of largely European apparel companies and retailers, grouped as the Accord
on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (the “Accord”), developed their own
initiative that arguably was more stringent in its requirements. Modeled after the
ILO’s tripartite form of governance, the Accord includes government, labor, and
business representatives in a Steering Committee that is presided by a representative
of the ILO. A third group of enterprises created the “Arrangement,” a voluntary
mechanism for providing remedies to victims and their families, autonomous of the
state and its courts. In parallel, the U.S. and EU used their leverage to press
Bangladesh to reform its labor laws and institutions, and the ILO and OECD
engaged in new norm making regarding global supply chain governance.
From his review of the fallout of the Rana Plaza factory collapse, Backer
applies TLO theory and two alternative theoretical frames: polycentric ordering and
neo-colonial state-based ordering. He analyzes their differences and
complementarities. Under each frame, he notes the shift in law and governance
away from the ideal notion of autonomous territorial states toward transnational
legal ordering and governance arrangements. He shows how the Rana Plaza Factory
collapse uncovers the dynamic, complex interweaving of national law, international
standards, and private governance that, together, could be viewed as a transnational
legal order. Yet, he also stresses how such legal ordering is polycentrically fractured,
calling into question the extent of transnational settlement over the applicable labor
norms. He thus suggests that it may be premature to speak of any settled order in
the absence of principles to manage the interactions among the different Rana Plaza
initiatives. He concludes that facts on the ground are shifting dynamically, which, in
turn, must inform theory.
Cynthia Williams’s article, “The Global Reporting Initiative, Transnational
Corporate Accountability, and Global Regulatory Counter-Currents,” examines the
development of corporate responsibility as a form of governance that takes a “new
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governance,” soft-law approach by focusing on disclosure and transparency. The
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a particularly significant initiative adopting this
approach, and its environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting has
become a global benchmark. As Williams notes, “82% of the Global 250 companies
use GRI as the basis for their corporate responsibility reporting. And as of 2015,
93% of the global 250 companies publish a stand-alone social report.”2 GRI reports
must include general and specific disclosures relevant to the industry, and set out
specific facts about the effects of a company’s operations on the environment,
society, and the economy.
The challenge with these voluntary reports, nonetheless, is that they often are
not comparable and so give little practical information for purposes of comparing
company performance. Such reporting also does not guarantee any real
sustainability impact, and some studies find that the GRI has not achieved much on
the ground. In contrast, a number of studies of particular mandatory non-financial
disclosure regimes have found operational effects, such as regarding water quality,
toxic release, mine safety, and restaurant quality. Williams contends that, consistent
with findings in the area of financial disclosure, “to have operational effects,
disclosure must be mandatory (so that disclosers cannot be selective in what they
disclose), specific, and targeted to clearly identified users.”3 She finds potential hope
in developments regarding mandatory reporting. For example, “many European
countries or their stock exchanges, and the European Union itself, require some
environmental or social disclosure, to varying degrees of specificity.”4
Unlike the area of corporate social responsibility, which involves soft law
(whether because it is voluntary or because it involves only disclosure), Williams
points out that other areas of binding hard law have developed that work counter
to sustainability goals. Williams notes, in particular, the proliferation of investorstate arbitration procedures, which grant rights to corporations to challenge national
and local regulatory decisions before arbitral panels whose rulings are binding. She
thus presses scholars of corporate social responsibility initiatives to address them in
the broader context of other forms of transnational legal ordering with which they
compete, conflict, and interact.
Regarding the TLO theoretical framework, Williams notes its important stress
on studying the ordering of local practice, as opposed to studying only international
or transnational formal texts that can be symbolic. As she writes, “how do particular
transnational frameworks ‘touch down’ in legal processes, contracts, or proceedings,
which by definition will involve local specification and an attention to hard law and
legal power, and what are the conflicts and contestations that the transnational

2. Cynthia Williams, The Global Reporting Initiative, Transnational Corporate Accountability, and Global
Regulatory Counter-Currents, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP L. 67, 74 (2016).
3. Id., at 82.
4. Id., at 72.
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regime engenders in the process.”5 What researchers must do, she asserts, pointing
to the TLO framework, is ask “Which norms, really, have settled where, in which
legal processes, and why?”6
Hannah Buxbaum’s article, “Transnational Legal Ordering and Regulatory
Conflict: Lessons from the Regulation of Cross-Border Derivatives,” addresses the regulation
of over-the-counter (OTC) financial derivatives. Despite the impulse provided by
the global financial crisis and considerable efforts, little convergence or settlement
of legal norms have occurred across states. States have reached consensus on certain
general principles, but significant regulatory divergence persists regarding their
implementation. Parts of a TLO have been shaped by a private ordering regime,
that of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), a transnational
private trade association, which has created a Master Agreement and schedules that
provide standardized documentation for OTC derivatives transactions. These
standardized contracts have become the global market norm. But convergence and
settlement of public regulatory norms has been limited.
The political economy of regulatory competition, Buxbaum explains, has
limited convergence in derivatives regulation. Although national governments want
to regulate derivative markets in order to counter systemic financial risks, they also
wish to attract capital. “Lawmakers therefore face continuing tension between the
need to strengthen regulation in the cross-border sphere and the desire to maintain
the competitiveness of their markets.”7 There have also been challenges of issue
alignment (in the U.S., different agencies address the issues differently), diagnostic
difference (regarding the nature of the problem), and a return of unilateralism
(including in rulemaking by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
which catalyzed European protests regarding the regulations’ extraterritorial scope).
Although common legal norms have not settled in this area, she contends that
a form of a TLO based on conflict of laws has developed. Domestic regulators work
within a framework of transnational norms regarding the allocation of regulatory
jurisdiction. They evaluate each other’s regulations to determine whether they
recognize them as equivalent to their own, and thus sufficient. And they engage in
intensive regulatory cooperation and information sharing with each other for
purposes of their own domestic securities law enforcement. Under this approach,
she notes, ultimately “it is domestic law, in the form of an equivalence or
comparability determination, that dictates whether compliance with a foreign
regime will be accepted as sufficient.”8 Such a system, she stresses, tolerates
regulatory diversity and uses “conflicts methodology to manage that divergence.”9

5. Id., at 81.
6. Id., at 88-89.
7. Hannah Buxbaum, Transnational Legal Ordering and Regulatory Conflict: Lessons from the Regulation
of Cross-Border Derivatives, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP L. 91, 95 (2016).
8. Id., at 114.
9. Id., at 116.
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Christopher Whytock’s article, “Conflict of Laws, Global Governance, and
Transnational Legal Order,” starts by recalling that conflict-of-laws rules govern three
basic questions: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Globally, there is no single harmonized conflict-of-laws TLO. Rather,
conflict-of-laws rules are largely national and they allocate governance authority
among different national jurisdictions. They produce order, but they do so in a
decentralized manner with little settlement of global conflict-of-laws norms across
national jurisdictions. Thus, he writes, “conflict of laws contributes to transnational
legal order, yet conflict of laws is itself transnationally disordered.”10
Whytock notes, however, that conflict-of-laws rules have certain common
principles, one of which is comity and another of which is the international law
grounds for exercising jurisdiction. He writes:
The principle of comity “suggests at a minimum an opposition to a
categorically parochial approach, whereby a court would always assert
jurisdiction, always apply its own nation’s law, and never recognize or
enforce a judgment of another nation’s court, and a recognition that
deference to another nation’s authority is at least sometimes appropriate—
by applying that nation’s law, respecting the jurisdiction of its courts, or
recognizing or enforcing the judgments of its courts. In addition, public
international law principles of jurisdiction—although contested—
contribute to the allocation of governance authority by placing limits on
the jurisdiction of states to prescribe, enforce and adjudicate.”11
There are nonetheless a series of developments in this area that give rise to
TLOs regionally and in certain substantive fields. In at least two regions (Europe
and Latin America) and two specialized areas of law (family law and commercial
law), conflict of laws is increasingly harmonized by international treaty, coordinated
under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,12 such
that common norms can settle across national borders, leading to conflict-of-laws
TLOs. The European regional TLO, through the European Union, is particularly
institutionalized, adopted by a European regional body and enforced by a European
regional court in coordination with national ones. As regards choice of law, these
rules specify what substantive law (such as what tort or contract law) applies to a
particular transnational situation. In terms of subject area TLOs developed through
the Hague Conference, the family conflict-of-laws TLO is more advanced than the
commercial one. Over ninety nations have ratified international child abduction and
adoption conventions, and there is significant national jurisprudence applying them.

10. Christopher A. Whytock, Conflict of Laws, Global Governance, and Transnational Legal Order, 1
U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP L. 117, 119 (2016).
11. Id., at 123 (footnote omitted).
12. The Hague Conference is “an international organization with seventy-eight members that
seeks the progressive unification of conflict-of-laws rules and private international law rules more
generally through the production of international conventions and other legal instruments.” Id., at 131.
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In substantive areas where norms are only partially settled, conflict-of-laws
rules interact with national substantive law, such as in bankruptcy law (studied by
Halliday)13 and securities law (studied by Buxbaum).14 They help determine “which
set of norms should govern which transnational bankruptcy or secured transactions
problems (choice of law), which courts (or other dispute resolution systems) should
adjudicate those problems (jurisdiction), and when courts in one nation should
recognize and enforce another nation’s resolution of those problems (recognition
and enforcement of judgments).”15 The result is a decentralized form of
transnational legal ordering.
Ralf Michaels’s article, “State Law as a Transnational Legal Order,” turns to the
theoretical plane by arguing that state law itself is transnationalized, and so state law
and TLOs are not distinct categories. He contends that TLO theory, as a result,
goes much further than providing a theory of a transnational body of law. It rather
points toward a theory of legal ordering tout court. Michaels writes:
Transnational suggests, in its term already, less an overcoming than a
transcending of the state. Transnational law (TL) is not above the state (like
supranational law), nor between states (like international law), nor,
necessarily, outside of states (like non-state law, though a connection
between non-state law and transnational law is often made). . .
[T]ransnational law, somehow, cuts through the distinction between
national and international, and thus between what is within and what is
without the state. It promises, in this sense to be law not without but beyond
the state.16
Michaels notes the ongoing critical role of the state in TLO theory. Its role
includes norm construction (providing legal norms adapted transnationally),
enforcement (enforcing transnational legal norms), recognition (recognizing
transnational hard and soft law norms as state law), and legitimation (through
incorporating the norms in state law and practice).
From this vantage, he questions whether state law and TLOs are qualitatively
different, to which I respond below. In contending that states can be TLOs,
Michaels maintains (reflecting a conflict-of-laws orientation) that states often
produce norms that are applied transnationally and thus no transnational institution
is needed. In his words, “instead of defining transnational rules as those created by
transnational institutions, we should define transnational institutions as those

13. See Terence C. Halliday, Architects of the State: International organizations and the Reconstruction of
States in East Asia, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE 1, 89, (Gregory
Shaffer ed., 2013); Block-Lieb and Terence C. Halliday, Settling and Concordance: Two Cases in Global
Commercial Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3, 75, (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer
eds., 2015).
14. Buxbaum, supra note 7.
15. Whytock, supra note 10, at 139.
16. Ralf Michaels, State Law as a Transnational Legal Order, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L
AND COMP L. 141, 141 (2016).
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producing transnational rules. If this is so, then the state certainly qualifies.”17 Going
further, he contends, “there is very little left to [purely] national legal orders.”18
Peer Zumbansen’s article “Where the Wild Things Are: Journeys to Transnational
Legal Orders, and Back” concludes the symposium by pointing to the importance of
theorizing “transnational law” “as a methodological lens through which to
scrutinize the emerging and evolving actors, norms and processes both within and
beyond the confines of the nation-state, a region or a municipality, a group or any
other form of collective.”19 While conventional international law scholarship
focuses on states and public law, and much transnational law scholarship focuses
on private actors and private law, Zumbansen agrees with the authors of
Transnational Legal Orders that both state and non-state actors and processes, and the
norms they promote, must be studied to understand the transnational. Going back
to the legal realists, he shows the ongoing need to call into question the publicprivate divide when it comes to law and governance and their impact. He thus
welcomes TLO theorists’ invitation to revisit the private law focus of some
transnational law theory.20
Zumbansen also stresses how much of conventional theorizing uses concepts
from the West as universals that are not fit to situations outside of it. He points to
the critical role of post-colonial and Third World Approaches to International law
(TWAIL) for undermining universal pretensions and in advancing the need for a
more pluralist form of theorizing that accounts for the lived experiences of people
outside the West. What we must do in studying the transnational, Zumbansen
stresses, is return to core legal realist insights regarding the importance of context.
Scholars should work not in a false heaven of concepts (especially those drawing
only from Western conventions, such as of the rule of law), but rather from the
messy world of facts. In doing so, scholars must attend to those voices that are not
being heard and reflected. We must, going back to the legal realists, constantly ask
“the hard questions as to who does what how and in whose interests.”21 To address these
questions, we must turn to a focus on actors, norms and processes in particular
contexts.
What Zumbansen means by “Where the Wild Things Are” is that the
methodological construct of transnational law thrusts us into a new terrain where
traditional distinctions as state and non-state, public and private, are less useful
because so much governance has become hybridized. The sheer complexity of the
situation makes normative assessment and critique much more difficult, and at the
same time urgent. We badly need frameworks and empirical studies to ground our
understanding of the transnational, but at the same time, Zumbansen insists, this is
17. Id., at 154.
18. Id., at 155.
19. Peer Zumbansen, Where the Wild Things Are: Journeys to Transnational Legal Orders, and Back, 1
U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP L. 161, 166 (2016).
20. See also Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, Annual Review of Social Science,
(forthcoming 2016).
21.
Zumbansen, supra note 19, at 192.
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not sufficient since we must act in the world and thus also need to develop
normative parameters, grounded in a pluralist approach, with which to engage with
the new world of transnational law.
THE SYMPOSIUM’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO TLO THEORY.
The scholars in this symposium seriously engage with TLO theory in light of
the social problems that societies confront today and the role that private and
business law play transnationally in providing order. They help advance TLO
theorizing, and theorizing generally, in critical ways.
Backer and Williams highlight the key roles of private actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, in creating norms that engage private practices around
the globe, such as in the areas of labor and corporate law. Both authors critically
show the importance of studying local practice and social dynamics to assess the
existence and operation of TLOs, rather than analyzing only legal texts agreed at
the transnational level. They also call attention to the need to study how different
transnational norms interact, as opposed to studying them in isolation. Williams
shows how new governance models can give rise to broader TLO structures, such
as regarding disclosure norms, but she raises the hypotheses that disclosure regimes
will more likely be effective if they are mandatory (and not voluntary) and if they
permit for comparisons that facilitate informed stakeholder responses.
Buxbaum and Whytock show the ongoing importance of conflict-of-laws rules
as an alternative to the creation of common substantive norms for transnational
legal ordering. The conflicts approach, in particular, facilitates transnational
ordering where effective and legitimate transnational institutions are lacking.
Buxbaum shows the efforts and challenges of creating substantive law TLOs to
address securities, such as financial derivatives. Because of ongoing regulatory
competition among states, coupled with divergent state regulatory preferences, the
legal ordering of derivatives remains predominantly national, other than a privately
developed regime that provides for standardized derivative contracts that has
become the global norm. As a result, conflict-of-laws rules are needed to provide a
decentralized form of public legal ordering through the allocation of governance
functions among national jurisdictions, albeit within a framework of high-level,
transnational regulatory principles and common transnational contracts. Whytock
likewise shows how private international law remains a critically important,
decentralized alternative for transnational legal ordering. Yet, Whytock also shows
how areas within private international law itself have become governed through
treaties that can give rise to conflict-of-laws TLOs. He shows how these conflictof-laws TLOs take both a regional and a substantive law form. He and Buxbaum
likewise show how transnational conflict-of-laws principles, such as the principles
of comity and mutual recognition, can develop informally.
Michaels and Zumbansen conclude by offering important theoretical insights
regarding the relation of the TLO framework to legal pluralism and the role of the
state. Both authors rightly stress that the state and state institutions remain critical
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to TLO theory, unlike in other transnational law theory. As Michaels notes, “One
could say that these TLOs ‘borrow’ the state’s institutions, and the state, in turn,
lends out its courts.”22 Under TLO theory, state law indeed becomes TLO law in
subject areas when transnational legal norms are adopted and practiced in a settled,
concordant way so that a new normal arises regarding the social understanding of
the legal norms that apply.23
Like Buxbaum and Whytock, Michaels stresses how national norms can apply
and produce order transnationally. Indeed, he is right that TLO theory must be
open to the study of TLOs that arise without a transnational institution. Halliday,
Shaffer and their collaborators have so far largely studied TLOs that involve
transnational institutions and networks in particular subject areas in which a
common conception of a problem is defined, and norms recursively interact up,
down, and across transnational, national, and local levels of social organization.
However, there is no requirement that a centralized transnational institution exist in
order for a TLO to develop. Rather, when norms become concordant and settle
transnationally, then one can speak of a TLO, whether or not a transnational
institution is part of that process.
Halliday and Shaffer, in their book Transnational Legal Orders, nonetheless differ
from Michaels regarding the scope of his claims that states are TLOs today, as when
he writes, “TLOs are not an anomaly but the norm; all laws are, presumably,
TLOs.”24 Michaels writes from the perspective of legal theory, inflected by systems
theory, at a more abstract level, whereas Halliday and Shaffer write from that of
socio-legal theory at a more empirical level. The two approaches at times view the
relation of state law and transnational law from different vantages. In much legal
theory, grounded in legal formalism and legal positivism, state law is enclosed within
a state constitutional order that provides secondary norms that define the law to be
recognized and applied by national courts. Much of transnational law theory,
building from Niklas Luhmann’s society-based conception of law, calls into
question that state-centric, legal formalist picture from a theoretical perspective,
noting that state law in reality is transnational law, as Michaels contends.
TLO theory, however, is a particular empirically-focused socio-legal theory
that examines the normative settlement of legal norms that transcend national
territorial boundaries. Critical to TLO theory is that state law and TLO law may or
may not be the same, depending on how legal norms settle in actual legal practice.
Where legal norms settle with radically different meanings in different national
contexts, no TLO (as Halliday and Shaffer define it) exists. TLO and state law
norms, however, are at times the same, since states serve to generate, enforce, and

22. Michaels, supra note 16, at 160.
23. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 1, at 43-44.
24. Michaels, supra note 16, at 160. Michaels’s approach parallels that of Patrick Glenn in his
book. See PATRICK GLENN, THE COSMOPOLITAN STATE vii (2013) (“states are cosmopolitan in their
origins, structures, populations, sources, and thought”).
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legitimate transnational legal norms, and these norms can settle concordantly. Yet,
as Buxbaum and others show, the creation of TLOs is often unsuccessful in
practice, and TLOs when formed can also unravel.25 Scholars using this framework
find many efforts to create TLOs, but many initiatives fail or only partially succeed.
The TLO theoretical approach does not predict that TLOs inevitably form; rather,
it provides a framework through which to address the success, failure,
transformation, settlement, and unsettlement of legal norms across states. As
Whytock and Buxbaum show in this symposium, when TLOs do not develop,
conflict-of-laws rules—with no coordination through a transnational institution—
retain importance as a form of transnational legal ordering. To apply TLO sociolegal theory, one must assess empirically whether there is a TLO in which the state
and state law comprise a part, including for purposes of recognition, enforcement,
and legitimation of the legal norms, or whether the legal norms have not settled
concordantly across states and so no TLO (as Halliday and Shaffer define it) has
been formed.
For TLO theory, states are both factors and objects, as Michaels points out.
States are factors in giving rise to TLOs in that state legal norms are often the origin
of transnational ones, and transnational norms typically depend on states directly
and indirectly, whether for their recognition, enforcement or legitimation. States are
also objects in TLO theory in that the state and state law are transformed and
transnationalized in the process. TLO theory is thus indeed an incipient theory of
legal orders more broadly, and Michaels’s analysis helps to highlight and show the
way. As he writes, “transnational law is no longer [viewed as] a body of law and does
indeed become a theory of law—though one informed no longer by state law as the
model but instead of TLOs as the model.”26 Legal theory should engage with the
phenomenon of TLOs for the reasons Michaels highlights, and empirical socio-legal
theory should address the reach and limits of TLOs within national and local legal
practice.
Finally, as Zumbansen stresses, the study of TLOs should engage with theories
of legal pluralism in light of the different social contexts in which law operates. In
a legal pluralist vein, Zumbansen points to the ongoing importance of normative
evaluation of TLOs since TLOs often impose Western concepts which are ill-suited
to local contexts. There is thus a need for both empirical study of how TLOs
operate, and ongoing normative engagement and critique of TLOs in light of the
different contextualized challenges that societies face today.

25.
See Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 1, at 507-11.
26. Michaels, supra note 16, at 160.

